Challenging the obsession with local level institutions in country ownership of climate change adaptation

Working with local level actors to enable country ownership is applauded within the multilateral climate finance landscape. However, are emerging adaptation interventions equitable by reflecting the priorities of local level vulnerable populations? This research sought to find out whether the engagement of local institutions in projects that seek to achieve country ownership enabled local level vulnerable groups to participate in and influence adaptation decision-making processes and outcomes, thereby enabling them to have a voice in local level adaptation. It used a case study of a Global Environmental Facility-managed coastal adaptation project in Tanzania, which sought to restore and protect mangroves to enable adaptation to sea level rise. Data was generated from 13 Focus Group Discussions and survey questionnaires administered to 629 individuals in three locations on the mainland of Tanzania and in Zanzibar. The findings indicate that community-based organizations were used to facilitate the implementation of project activities at the community level. However, participation spaces created in the project and facilitated by these local institutions were exclusionary and failed to enable vulnerable community groups to have a voice on mangrove restoration and protection. Use of these local institutions altered local level power relations and disempowered other pre-existing and (in)formal local resource management institutions. Community members questioned legitimacy of actions implemented by these local institutions. These findings suggest that working with local level stakeholders to generate country ownership does not automatically guarantee that actions will address the needs of local vulnerable groups. Multilateral climate finance institutions should acknowledge these risks and implement measures to address them.     

The trade-offs between economic efficiency and job creation in olive grove smallholdings

Cooperation among farmers is an effective alternative to reduce production costs in smallholdings of traditional olive groves and increase their low profitability. However, an increase in efficiency reduces working hours and the labour required for the management of farms. This fact can lead to negative effects in rural areas, especially considering the importance of the social aspect of the crop. Therefore, to contribute to the global discussion on the transition towards more sustainable farming, it is important to know, ex ante, what level of employment is generated by olive groves and what could be lost under more competitive and efficient scenarios. The purpose of the work is to quantify the expected impact on employment by the implementation of cooperative management methods in order to generate true and accurate information that can be used in the design of future policies that aim to increase the economic profitability of small olive farms. The results make clear that this way of managing farms, by increasing the efficiency of agricultural work, has a significant negative impact on employment. However, this management formula does encourage the professionalisation of the sector by generating quality employment, in addition to contributing to the preservation of small farms and the socio-cultural and territorial benefits they generate.     

Urban Commoning as a Vehicle Between Government Institutions and Informality: Collective Gardening Practices in Tampere and Narva

This article examines the processes of urban commoning and its co-produced features of urbanity, making the claim that, through these processes, informality becomes translated into institutionalized city planning. Commoning is analysed through a comparative study that utilizes contingent features of urbanity and three modalities accommodating the informality–formality meshwork during urban change. The article contributes to research on urban transformations by integrating commons, informality dynamics and the constitution of state institutions. This focus is elaborated with reference to collective gardening practices in the context of two of the less studied European cities, Narva in Estonia and Tampere in Finland. The results of the study indicate that urban commoning takes place through delegating a public mandate and enacting uncertainty, two processes that informalize city government practices. Particular differences appeared in regard to the institutional porosity that enables unregulated spaces of collective gardening to be mobilized as part of urban politics. We argue that networked movements appear as an essential part of the urban logic of action producing meaningful connections in an informal–formal meshwork and bringing together multiple sites in the commoning process.     

Do institutional investors drive corporate transparency regarding business contribution to the sustainable development goals?

Institutional investors show increasing interest in how companies align their corporate social responsibility strategies with the sustainable development goals (SDGs) proposed by the United Nations (UN). The information disclosed in this regard is essential to know and monitor business contribution to the 2030 Agenda. In this paper, we analyze the influence that institutional investors have on the adoption of the disclosure strategy established by UN and the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI)—GRI‐SDG Compass. The results obtained for a sample of 989 international companies, which prepare their sustainability reports following the GRI guidelines, show that ownership by foreign investors, pension funds, and “other” investors boosts the relevance of the information disclosed in relation to the 2030 Agenda. On the contrary, government, financial institutions, and cross holdings have no impact on the information systems developed.     

The Level and Stability of Institutional Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence from Taiwan

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the influence of shareholding stability of institutional investors on firm performance. We analyze 647 sample companies listed in the Taiwan Stock Exchange from 2005 to 2009 using the coefficient of variance of institutional holding proportion as the measure for ownership stability. The empirical results show that increasing stability of institutional holdings is related to better firm performance. The low-risk and younger firms with higher CEO incentive compensation, larger insider holdings, and higher growth usually have better performance. Furthermore, when the long-term institutional shareholdings, particularly of foreign institutions, are higher, the firm performance is better.     

交易成本、禀赋效应与国有股权转让定价——兼论国有企业混合所有制改革的新思路

国有企业混合所有制改革是积极发展混合所有制经济的关键,完善的定价机制有助于推进国有企业混合所有制改革。国有股转让过程中存在大量的交易成本,扭曲了定价体系。基于科斯定理,可以发现,明晰产权是优化定价体系有效途径。但是,禀赋效应的存在,使得科斯定理无法完全解决国有股转让定价问题。对此,需要采取市场和非市场的政策组合,以此来完善国有股转让定价机制,推进国有企业混合所有制改革。     

二元经济结构转换与发展农村集体经济

刘易斯在吸收了马克思和古典经济学家关于劳动力和经济增长理论的基础上,指出新古典增长模型忽视了部分发展中国家劳动力无限供给这一特征,认为工业化的发展能带动农业的现代化。但是中国目前大量的剩余劳动力的存在,城乡差距的拉大,使人们意识到由于我国特殊的国情和“增长极”的作用,解决农村问题的关键是要依靠自身的发展,发展集体经济,提高农村劳动生产率,促进工农业均衡发展,建设社会主义新农村。     

Financial Reporting Quality in Private Equity Backed Companies: The Impact of Ownership Concentration

We empirically show on a sample of 270 unquoted, private equity backed companies that the shareholder structure of private companies impacts the quality of their publicly available accounting information. More precisely, companies in which private equity (PE) investors have a high equity stake produce lower quality accounting information than companies in which PE investors have a low equity stake, after controlling for factors like company size and age. We explain our findings by arguing that PE investors with low equity stakes have a higher need for high quality accounting information whereas PE investors with high equity stakes have other means to closely monitor their portfolio companies. This paper has benefited form discussions with workshop participants at the Max Planck Institute. We specifically want to thank Lorraine Uhlaner and Mike Wright (guest editors), two anonymous referees as well as ignace De Beelde, Wouter De Maeseneire, Marc Deloof, Miguel Meuleman and Lloyd Steier for helpful suggestions. Part of this research was completed when Christof Beuselinck was an FWO Scholar at Ghent University. Financial support from the Fonds of Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek (Grant G.0012.02) is kindly appreciated. The usual disclaimer applies.     

风景名胜资源产权辨析及使用权分割

所有权既是一个法律概念，也是一个经济概念。法律框架下的风景名胜资源的所有权并不能达到产权意义上对资源使用的约束和激励。在所有权归属不变的前提下，从资源的物质角度可以确定出比较重要的三项权利——占有权、使用权和管理权。它们在不同的经济关系中有不同的表现形式。风景名胜资源产权分割的分析表明：资源管理也可以拒绝经营权；当所有者代理人选择经营权后，选择经营者、决定转让价格、制定约束合同是产权变更的关键环节。     

The Decomposition of the Corporate Body: What Kant Cannot Contribute to Business Ethics

Kant is gaining popularity in business ethics because the categorical imperative rules out actions such as deceptive advertising and exploitative working conditions, both of which treat people merely as means to an end. However, those who apply Kant in this way often hold businesses themselves morally accountable, and this conception of collective responsibility contradicts the kind of moral agency that underlies Kant’s ethics. A business has neither inclinations nor the capacity to reason, so it lacks the conditions necessary for constraint by the moral law. Instead, corporate policies ought to be understood as analogous to legal constraints. They may encourage or discourage certain actions, but they cannot determine a person’s maxim – which for Kant is the focus of moral judgment. Because there is no collective intention apart from any intentions of the individual agents who act as members of the corporation, an organization itself has no moral obligations. This poses a dilemma: either apply the categorical imperative to the actions of particular businesspeople and surrender the notion of collective responsibility, or apply a different moral theory to the actions of businesses themselves. Given the diffusion of responsibility in a bureaucracy, the explanatory usefulness of collective responsibility may force business ethicists to abandon Kant’s moral philosophy.